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Abstract 
Appraisal theories of emotion have two fundamental assumptions: (a) that there 
are regularities to be discovered between situations and components of emotional 
episodes, and (b) that the influence of these situations on these components is causally 
mediated by a mental process called appraisal. Appraisal theories come in different 
flavors, proposing different to-be-explained phenomena and different underlying 
mechanisms for the influence of appraisal on the other components. 
  
1. What are the essential elements of your theory of emotion?  Which elements are 
shared by different theories?  What element(s) distinguish(es) your theory from the 
others? 
Appraisal theories of emotion (e.g., Ellsworth, 2013; Frijda, 2007; Lazarus, 1991; 
Roseman, 2013; Scherer, 2009) come in two broad flavors. Each has its own proposal 
about what the to-be-explained phenomena are and how to causally explain them.  
The to-be-explained phenomena 
To arrive at a prescriptive or technical definition of emotion, appraisal theorists 
start from the descriptive or folk definition and trim it down so that the resulting set of 
instances is homogeneous according to the following criteria: A first criterion is that 
emotions are episodes that are triggered by a stimulus and that consist of several of the 
following components: changes in appraisal, action tendencies, somatic responses, 
expressive behavior, and experience or feelings. Additional criteria are that emotional 
episodes (a) contain an appraisal that the stimulus is relevant for a central goal or concern 
(cf. Moors, 2007, 2013; Oatley & Johnson-Laird, 1987), (b) contain an action tendency 
with control precedence (i.e., one that takes priority over other goals, Frijda, 2007) and/or 
(c) have strongly synchronizing components (Scherer, 2009). It may be noted that these 
criteria are all gradual in nature (episodes are more or less relevant to more or less central 
concerns; action tendencies take precedence with more or less force; and components can 
synchronize to a more or less extent), thus allowing for relative conclusions only (e.g., 
one episode is more/less emotional than another). Sharp distinctions between emotional 
vs. nonemotional episodes are only possible when some treshold is chosen (e.g., an 
episode could be called emotional when an episode exceeds a certain degree of goal 
relevance, control precedence, and/or synchronization). Despite believing in the heuristic 
value of their criteria, several appraisal theorists realize that any criterion or treshold 
contains an element of choice not open to empirical test, and that there is a great lack of 
consensus. 
Appraisal theories not only propose ways to demarcate the set of emotional 
episodes, but also ways to organize the variety within this set. A first flavor of appraisal 
theories (e.g., Lazarus, 1991; Roseman, 2013) splits the set into a limited number of 
subsets, corresponding to the specific emotions figuring in natural language (e.g., anger, 
fear, sadness). Proponents of the first flavor take these specific emotions as the 
phenomena to be explained. A second flavor of appraisal theories (e.g., Scherer, 2009) 
splits emotional episodes into a large or even infinite number of subsets, each 
characterized by a unique situation and hence a unique pattern of appraisal values. This 
has led proponents of the second flavor to shift the to-be-explained phenomenon from 
specific emotions to (sub)emotional components (cf. Ortony & Turner, 1990). For 
instance, instead of trying to explain anger or fear, they try to explain the tendencies to 
dominate, attack, freeze, or avoid, without linking them to anger and fear, and ultimately 
even, without worrying about whether the components under study are emotional or not 
(Moors, 2013). 
Explanation 
Appraisal theories explain the occurrence of and the variety within the set of 
emotional episodes by making appeal to the process of appraisal. This explanation can be 
split into two fundamental assumptions. The first is that there are regularities or regular 
relations to be discovered among situations, on the one hand, and emotional episodes or 
components, on the other. For example, situations leading to the tendency to attack have 
something in common and they differ from those leading to the tendency to run away. In 
addition, appraisal theories have detailed hypotheses about the features of the situations 
involved in these regularities. Crucially, they argue that emotional episodes or 
components are not determined by intrinsic stimulus features but by features or factors 
characterizing the interaction between the stimulus and the internal or external context. 
Examples of factors shared by most appraisal theories are the extent to which a stimulus 
is relevant for (goal relevance) and congruent with a person’s goals/concerns (goal 
congruence) and expectations (expectancy), and whether the person caused the 
occurrence of the stimulus (agency) and is able to control its consequences (contol). The 
exact list of appraisal factors and the exact hypotheses about links between appraisal 
values and emotions/components differs among individual appraisal theories. These 
hypotheses have the status of working hypotheses and are open to empirical corrections. 
A second fundamental assumption of appraisal theories is that the proposed 
appraisal factors must also be processed by the organism. It is not sufficient that a 
stimulus is goal relevant or that a person has little control; the organism needs to detect 
this also in some way (Frijda, 1986, p. 330; Moors, 2007). From this follows the postulate 
of appraisal theories that there is a mental process of appraisal in which a stimulus is 
evaluated on the proposed appraisal factors and that this process causes the other 
components. Once the appraisal process has produced an output (a representation of 
appraisal values, in any type of format) it drives changes in action tendencies, somatic 
responses, and motor behavior. Aspects of all these changes emerge into consciousness. 
The integration of these conscious aspects constitutes the content of the feeling 
component. Feelings may or may not be categorized or labeled with a specific emotion 
name.  
Appraisal theories make almost no restrictions to the types of mechanisms that 
can underlie appraisal or the format of the representations on which these mechanisms 
can operate. Appraisal can be constructive, in the sense that information from different 
sources is combined on the spot, or it can be nonconstructive, in the sense that the 
stimulus by itself may trigger an already stored pattern of appraisal values. It is assumed 
that both can operate under conditions of automaticity, and that both can operate on all 
kinds of representations (e.g., propositional, conceptual, perceptual, sensori-motor, 
embodied; Moors, 2010). 
The two flavors of appraisal theories each propose a different mechanism 
underlying the influence of appraisal on the other components. The first flavor proposes 
that the appraisal values are integrated in a pattern, perhaps linked to some core relational 
theme (e.g., danger, loss) and that this determines the specific emotion that occurs (e.g., 
fear, sadness). Once this is determined, the other components that belong to the emotion 
are activated. The transition from the core relational theme to the other components may 
even be mediated by an affect program (i.e., a dedicated brain circuit for the emotion). 
Hence this view is compatible with affect program theories (e.g., Ekman, 1994; 
Panksepp, 2012).  
The second flavor proposes that each appraisal value determines part of the other 
components, and together these parts form the emotion. Here, emotion is an emergent 
phenomenon. There are many possible combinations of appraisal values and hence many 
possible emotions. Whereas the first flavor tries to discover the appraisal patterns causing 
specific emotions, the second flavor examines the influence of appaisal values on other 
components without linking them to specific emotions.  
Second flavor appraisal theories share the idea with constructivist theories that 
emotional episodes emerge out of processes that are not specific to emotion (Brosch, 
2013). The appraisal process is not specific: it is neither necessary (there may be 
alternative causes, such as direct brain stimulation and imitation), nor sufficient (appraisal 
with the output goal irrelevant does not produce emotional components). 
The second flavor subsumes several detailed scenarios of the transition from 
appraisal to the other components. One scenario is that each appraisal value shapes one 
aspect of the action tendency, which in turn shapes one aspect of the physiological 
response pattern and one aspect of the action. Another scenario is that each appraisal 
value contributes to the negotiation and selection of an entire action tendency (e.g., to 
attack), which engages the appropriate physiological response pattern needed to 
implement the action. Still another scenario is that some appraisal values (e.g., goal 
incongruence) give rise to the most general action tendency (e.g., to undo the goal 
incongruence), which in turn gives rise to ever more concrete action tendencies (e.g., to 
dominate) depending on other appraisal values (e.g., when control is high). Scenario 1 
and 3 are compatible with either a simultaneous or sequential processing of the appraisal 
values. In the sequential case, early appraisal values may already exert their influence on 
the other components, and the outputs of these other components may feed back to the 
appraisal component to start a new cycle (e.g., Scherer, 2009). 
The causal claim has been criticized on several grounds. Some critics seem to 
deny the possibility of mental causation in general (e.g., Ramsey, 2008). Yet not all 
critics who deny the causal role of appraisal seem to consistently deny the causal role of 
all mental processes. Social and psychological constructivists typically dismiss or de-
emphasize the causal role of appraisal while allowing or emphasizing the causal role of 
other mental processes. A few examples: Parkinson (1995) argued that emotional 
interactions consist in behavior aimed at communicating what the interaction partners 
want to do or how they want to be (treated) in the relationship. Thus, behavior can be 
classified as part of an emotional interaction not based on its superficial features but 
based on the action tendencies that generated it. Like other motivational constructs, 
action tendencies are considered mental constructs (Bargh, 1997). Barrett (2012) argued 
that individuals categorize bodily changes along with the immediate situation as an 
emotional episode. Here, the mental process of categorization is said to influence only the 
content of experience (“I am angry”) and not to produce a state with a distinct 
physiological signature. This may not count as a classic example of mental causation (i.e., 
mental events causing physical events). Yet both Parkinson (1995) and Barrett (2012) 
have added that once people think they have a certain emotion (e.g., “I am angry”) this 
may influence their behavior (e.g., they may become more aggressive) and this does seem 
to be a classic case of mental causation.  
The strong objections against the causal claim even has led some appraisal 
theorists to abandon it, while retaining the idea that appraisal factors describe the 
regularities between situations and emotional episodes (e.g., Clore & Ortony, 2013). 
These authors, moreover, claim to be committed only to appraisal as a component of 
emotional episodes, or better perhaps, appraisal as part of the content of the feeling 
component (Moors, 2013). What is puzzling, however, is how appraisal factors can be 
taken both as descriptions of the situation and as descriptions of the feeling content, 
without assuming some mental process for doing the translation from situation to feeling.   
It may be noted that not even all constructivist theorists are dismissive of a causal 
role of appraisal. In Cunningham, Dunham, and Stillman’s (2013) model, for example, 
core affect may stem from the (primary) appraisal of a discrepancy between a stimulus 
(be it the situation or proprioceptive feedback) and a concern or expectation. Other 
features of the situation progressively constrain the interpretation in iterative reprocessing 
cycles, where the constraining can be done by (secondary) appraisal or other 
categorization processes1. Likwise, Russell (2012) allows causal influences among 
components (including those stemming from appraisal), but he sees them as less strong 
than appraisal theorists usually do.  
2. One way to clarify just what a claim includes is to ask what it excludes.  That is, 
what would falsify a claim?  Please elaborate on those distinguishing elements of 
your theory by stating how, at least in principle, they would be falsified.   
To falsify the first assumption, that there are regularities between situations and 
emotional episodes or components, one should demonstrate that no such regularities 
exist. This seems an unrealistic purpose of investigation. It seems more fruitful to try 
falsifying detailed hypotheses of individual appraisal theories about links between 
specific appraisal values (e.g., goal incongruent) and specific values of the other 
components (e.g., corrugator activity).  
Falsifying the second assumption, that appraisal is a mental process causally 
mediating the influence of encounters on emotional components, is not an easy task 
either. To determine whether appraisal causes the other components, we need to establish 
whether appraisal has occurred and we need to determine whether the components are 
emotional or not. Like any mental process, appraisal is not directly observable but needs 
to be inferred from observable responses. The criteria for demarcating emotional episodes 
proposed by appraisal theorists are gradual in nature and there is no consensus. Even if 
consensus would be reached about a behavioral or neurological proxy for appraisal and 
about which components to count as emotional, we still face the problem that most 
appraisal theorists do not see appraisal as a necessary cause of the other components.  
3. How does your theory view the relation of emotional experience (the subjective 
conscious feeling in an emotion) to the perception of emotion in another? What is 
each process? Are they qualitatively different processes?  The same process?  Are 
they linked? 
Appraisal theories take the experience or feeling component to be the reflection of 
aspects of all the other components into consciousness. Thus, each of the other 
components determines part of the content of emotional experience. This experience can, 
but does not have to be labeled with an emotion word. If it does get labeled, the label also 
enters consciousness where it also colors the emotional experience. Crucially, appraisal 
theories accept that there can be emotional experience without categorization or labeling 
of the experience as emotional (or as angry, sad, and fearful). In this respect, they differ 
from Barrett’s (this issue) psychological constructivist theory.  
The processes involved in the production of emotional experience are ones 
involved in the production of consciousness. The processes involved in the conscious 
perception of other people’s emotions may be quite similar. The output or content of 
experience and conscious perception, however, will be different. Consciousness is often 
said to have an aboutness aspect (i.e., what it refers to) and a phenomenal aspect (i.e., the 
pure feeling; Block, 1995). When I have an emotional experience, I have access to 
different information than when I perceive someone else having an emotion. I can 
become aware of my own but not of another’s appraisals, action tendencies, and 
physiological responses. But even if I would have complete access to the aboutness 
aspect of the other person’s experience, I would still not share the phenomenal aspect of 
her experience.   
4. Emotions are now typically thought of as having components, such as changes in the 
peripheral nervous system, facial movements, and instrumental behavior. What 
precisely does your theory say about the relation of emotion to the components? 
Talk of emotional episodes and components, obviously, implies a part-whole 
relation. Most appraisal theorists see emotional episodes as collections of components. At 
first sight, this seems incompatible with the idea in first flavor appraisal theories that the 
influence of appraisal on the other components is mediated by emotion. There are a few 
ways in which this idea can be understood, however. One interpretation is that an 
emotional episode consist of components, but that an emotion, equated narowly with one 
of the components (e.g., an abstract action tendency or strategy), is the mediator. Another 
interpretation is that the influence of appraisal on the other components is mediated by 
the detection or registration of the emotion at stake, not by the emotion itself. The first 
interpretation is not fundamentally different from Scenarios 2 and 3 subsumed under the 
second flavor of appraisal theories (cf. above). The second interpretation, on the other 
hand, is radically different in that for the second flavor, no detection of (or categorization 
in terms of) any specific emotion is required at any time before appraisal can exert its 
influence on the other components.  
5. Is there variability in emotional responding within a given category of emotion (such 
as fear, anger, etc.)?  If so, how does your theory explain that variability? 
The first flavor of appraisal theories assumes that there are fixed patterns of 
appraisal for each emotion subset (or category). Each emotion subset, in turn, is linked to 
a fixed action tendency couched in fairly abstract terms (e.g., attack, dominate, withdraw, 
cf. Roseman, 2013). Within each emotion subset, there is variability in more concrete 
action tendencies/actions as long as they are a means to the fullfilment of the abstract 
action tendency characteristic of the emotion category. For example, fear could be 
characterized by a tendency to withdraw, which can be manifested in concrete action 
tendencies/actions like hiding, running, postponing, and averting one’s gaze. The 
concrete action tendencies/actions are determined by the specific features of the situation, 
but processing of these features is not counted as part of the appraisal process. Additional 
variability can stem from regulation processes that interfere with the transition of the 
abstract action tendency into the concrete action tendencies/actions.  
Proponents of the second flavor of appraisal theories do not consider emotion 
subsets such as fear and anger as the phenomena to be explained and so there is no 
variability to be explained within these subsets. Instead, they try to explain the variety 
within emotional components (changes in action tendencies, somatic responses, 
expressive behavior, and feelings). Driven by a desire to find general regularities and to 
be parsimonious, appraisal theories of the second flavor have started out with a relatively 
small set of appraisal factors, assuming that combinations of values on these factors 
already explain a great deal of the variety in emotional components (e.g., they may 
already suffice to determine the abstract action tendency). But the number of factors is 
not fixed; they need to be refined and supplemented with other factors to account for 
additional variety (e.g., the concrete action tendency/action). Proponents of the second 
flavor see it as their task to discover and map out these additional factors. It is precisely 
because of the difficulties to demarcate the set of emotional episodes (cf. above) that 
there is no a priori limit to the number of factors that should be counted as appraisal or 
that should be studied. Second flavor appraisal researchers can find inspiration in other 
research traditions to extend their list of factors. For example, Carver and Scheier (1990) 
refine the factor goal congruence with the factor of the velocity with which the goal is 
attained. Attribution theorists (Weiner, 1985) refine agency by adding factors such as 
stability and locus of cause. Social constructivist theories (Boiger & Mesquita, 2012) 
suggest the importance of status, role, and norms about the appropriateness of behavior 
in different contexts. Before appraisal theories will add new appraisal factors to their list, 
however, they will have to be convinced that the influence of these new factors is not 
mediated by already existing appraisal factors. Take the finding that status influences 
whether a person will engage in aggressive behavior (Diekmann, JungbauerGans, 
Krassnig, & Lorenz, 1996). Status will not be taken up as a new appraisal factor if its 
influence is mediated, for example, by the existing appraisal factor of control. 
In addition to the issue of mediation, there is the issue of moderation. In the first 
flavor of appraisal theories, the relation between appraisal patterns and emotions is fixed 
and universal (the same in all persons of all cultures). Person and culture factors can 
influence the relation between stimuli and appraisal patterns and the relations between 
emotions and the other components, but not the relation between appraisal patterns and 
emotions. The second flavor of appraisal theories, by contrast, accepts that person and 
culture factors can moderate the relations among all components.  For example, 
individual tresholds for action tendencies likely moderate the relation between appraisals 
and action tendencies.  
I hope to have shown that appraisal theories (especially of the second flavor) are 
profoundly situated, and that they offer an ambitious research program for increasing 
insight into the specific situational factors involved in the variety of phenomena that 
emotion researchers are interested in.   
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Footnotes 
1The appraisal process is also a categorization process, but one with a different input and 
output than the categorization process proposed in psychological constructivist theories. 
In appraisal theories, the situation is categorized as goal relevant, goal incongruent, and 
difficult to control (etc.); in constructivist theories, the core affect is categorized as anger, 
fear, and sadness (etc.).   
